Following on from my last post, I’ve been digging further into Broken Hill miners (such as BHP) and Port Pirie smelting (BHAS, basically). Expect a lot of spoil and a small amount of shock and ore.
BHP at Port Pirie and Whyalla
I found this article on Trove from 28th August 1948 (from the BHP AGM the previous day) that I think sheds light on what was going on in Port Pirie and the port at Whyalla (just across the gulf) at the time. The section I found most interesting was this:
In co-operation with the Department of Immigration, we are endeavouring to recruit skilled tradesmen in the United Kingdom. This additional labour will be employed at Whyalla in the shipyard and on home building, and at Port Kembla on plant construction.
Suitable accommodation near to the place of employment is essential in attracting additional employees. Under normal conditions, the building of new homes might reasonably have been expected to have kept pace with the needs of a growing population, but because of the intervention of the war and existing conditions, the acute shortage of accommodation still prevails.
To assist in meeting the situation, hostels are being established at Whyalla, Port Kembla, and Newcastle to house the men who will be recruited from within the Commonwealth and from overseas for employment in our works at those centres. We are co-operating with the Federal and respective State Governments on these projects.
This fits neatly with the situations vacant listed in the Adelaide Advertiser for November 1948 that I listed previously.
History of BHP
I also found a history of mining at Broken Hill that said that BHP had stopped mining there in 1939:
In 1939 BHP ceased all mining operations at Broken Hill. The company planned to concentrate on iron and steel manufacturing at Newcastle and Whyalla. The same year the Sulphide Corporation closed the Central Mine. For the remaining companies on the lode, wartime metal prices again financed development. Much of the central lode remained silent, but in 1943 Broken Hill South took over BHP’s Blocks 10-13 and in 1945 re-opened the Kintore shaft. The old South company now owned the centre of the lode, and the Zinc Corporation was the new South.
Hence I think I need to get a better source of information for what the actual situation was in 1948. In fact, it turns out that there’s a book written in 1948 discussing BHP: “Australia’s iron & steel industry : The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd“. However, this seems just about as rare as hen’s teeth (there’s a copy in the NLA and another in the SLQ). I’d get a copy by Copies Direct but I have no idea what’s actually in it.
“Accounting for Lead Poisoning, the Medical Politics of Occupational Health”
I’ve now received a copy of Richard Gillespie’s fascinating 1990 article on lead poisoning in Port Pirie (thanks Jo!!!!), and – my goodness! – it paints a pretty bleak picture. Lead poisoning itself wasn’t a recognised condition until 1917, by which time the smelting workforce in Port Pirie had been comprehensively poisoned. Any payments before then for (what we would now think of as) lead poisoning were framed as ‘charitable assistance’ by the company, without accepting any actual responsibility. Workers were also terrorized into thinking that reporting any illness would get them instantly laid off, rather than actually helped: unsurprisingly, reporting rates were extremely low.
It was only in the early 1920s that workers were given solid assurances that they could report health issues without being kicked out: but then BHAS moved on to corrupting the medical evaluation process, with in-house doctors (only the most “conservative” were chosen, by which they meant “pro-company” and “anti-worker”) disallowing most claims via one blatant ruse or another.
There was then a Royal Commission: but this process too was quickly controlled by the companies, and the fundamental imbalance favouring the mining companies’ profits over workers’ health remained in place. All that really changed was the “sophisticat[ion]” (p.316) of the managers’ arguments, which by the end were no more than a crafty casserole of victim blaming and outright lying. Basically, the central conceit was to distinguish “between lead absorption and lead poisoning” (p.330), which in my opinion is just a rhetorical device for somehow blaming people for ‘allowing themselves to be poisoned’ (how?).
And before you write all this off as ancient history, the same specious arguments devised by BHAS were eagerly recycled by the gas companies in America in the 1920s to somehow justify why they should be allowed to add lead tetraethyl to petrol. So BHAS didn’t just give its workers lead poisoning, it helped the gasoline giants expose all of us to environmental lead for the century since. Eat lead, suckers.
Anyway, 1925/1926 is essentially where Gillespie’s account stops, though it is easy to see that with (metaphorically) toxic management running a (literally) toxic industry, nothing much was likely to change quickly. So I think we can easily see exactly how much support someone with dangerously high levels of lead exposure would get in 1948 from the Port Pirie managers at BHAS. Which is basically none.
Levels of lead exposure
Gillespie also mentions (p.322) typical levels of worker lead exposure (via inhalation) in the roasting plant, that were released a year after the Royal Commission:
- 2.2 mg of lead at the top of the A section
- 3.6 mg at the top of the mixing bin
- 19.8 mg at the discharge end of the secondary rolls
- 52.8 mg above the conveyors.
This should be compared to Chapman’s estimation that 1—2 mg of lead per day could cause lead poisoning, and that a hygiene standard should be set at 0.2 mg to ensure that no lead poisoning would occur.
Note that after improvements made to the conveyors (from tray to belt) in the couple of years following, “lead levels fell from 37 mg to 1.44 mg”. (p.326) But one of the worst (as far as lead exposure goes) places in the plant was “the baghouse“. Gillespie notes that “workers periodically had to enter the dusty chambers to clean and recondition the bags; cases of lead poisoning continued to occur, and this became one of
the jobs reserved for foreign workers.” (Gillespie’s footnote 51 says: see [Frank A. Green, The Port Pirie Smelters (Melbourne, 1977)], p.110).
[Yes, I’d happily order the copy of Green’s book that’s on sale in Germany, but 40 euros for shipping to the UK? Really? What has gone wrong with bookselling recently?]
All in all, I can’t help but wonder whether what we would now consider catastrophically high levels of lead might simply have been the expected level for someone – a migrant worker, or perhaps even Carl Webb? – working in BHAS’ baghouse in November 1948.




